This book (one of David Ray Griffin’s SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought) is a scholarly debate with Huston Smith between religious philosophies to replace the “waning worldview of modernity.” (For their books I've read, click on an author's name.)

It deals with “God questions” only, with hardly any mention of the Bible, Jesus, or “supernatural theism” (which both men briefly dispose of). Smith proposes the “perennial philosophy” or “primordial tradition;” Griffin offers “postmodern process theology.” They debate these issues: the relation of Christianity to other religions; the ultimate reality of a personal God in relation to a transpersonal absolute; the ultimate reality of time and progress; the problem of evil; the nature of immortality; the relation of humans to nature; the relation of science to theology; the relation of upward to downward causation; and the possibility of agreed-upon criteria for deciding between competing worldviews. The Introduction says: “We agree on far more than divides us, but in this book we only allude to our commonalities so we can get on with the differences.”

At the onset they come up with fifteen points of philosophical differences. By the end, neither has converted the other, but by very thorough analysis of the presumptions and meanings of the many “isms” in their debate, they have cut these to five serious points of irresolvable contention. The Afterword is a “stalemate” summary. They “sort of” agree that primordial truth means hard-core commonsense beliefs, but Smith’s “intellect” isn’t quite the same as Griffin’s “prehension” (a Whiteheadian word). As Griffin says, Smith accepts my examples (causality, freedom, time, reality, evil, ultimate meaning) as universal, but only if they are left vague. David Ray Griffin relentlessly insists on self-consistent, well-defined concepts, whereas Smith’s vagueness is necessary for him to retain his “awe and wonder” of “a God worth worshiping.” Huston Smith ultimately regards time and evil as “unreal” since only the transcendental, only God, is really real – thus Smith seems to reluctantly accept Griffin’s conclusion that Smith’s worldview is a “transcendental” pantheism. In contrast, Griffin’s worldview is panentheistic with both the world and the transcendental as real. This book identified and clarified some of the vagueness I noted earlier in Smith’s worldview. It is a hard read, recommended for those with an appetite for detailed philosophical arguments. Because of Smith's vagueness I think Griffin got the better of Smith in this debate.